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An Analysis of Hohfeld
The words commonly used to describe legal relations
frequently convey multiple inconsistent meanings. The
confusion that results from this inherent weakness in
the language of the law has produced nany attempts to
reduce that language to terms that sWggest a single idea.
A most remarkable theory of reduction was expressed
in Professor Hohfeld's formulation of a logical system
of language based on fundamental legal conceptions. In
this Article, Mister Roy L. Stone criticallyexamines these
conceptions and the language employed in establishing
them. He concludes that Hohfeldian logic is based on certain invalid assumptions that necessarily preclude its
implementation in the resolution of legal issues.

Roy L. Stone*
I.

LANGUAGE AND META-LANGUAGE

We have come to a time and a place where we must consider the logic or that artificial reason of the law that is embodied
in what Hohfeld calls fundamental legal conceptions. In ordinary legal usage, this logic may be found in the various terms
contained in the entries of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary or in
Words and Phrases Judicially Defined. A list of such terms could
be prepared after the manner of Professor Austin's advice in his
lecture on 'Excuses,"' and a description of the use of each such
term in the ordinary range of its application in the judicial process should disclose what was formerly called the logical space or
the logical geography of the word. We will learn how each word
is used, in what relation one word stands to its neighbor, and
in what conditions a particular word may be appropriately used.
Whether we adopt this methodology is a matter of choice; we
will choose this method if we accept, as part of our general philosophic outlook, several propositions: Logic is posterior, not prior,
to language; logic issues out of tautologies rather than language,
for logic is not empirically derived. Language possesses an open
texture and is based upon different strata. As Strawson argues,
*Barrister-at-Law, London, England.
1. A-usTN, A Plea for Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERs 123 (Urmson

&Warnock ed. 1961).
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language functions independently of logic and although logic may
test the truth and falsity of statements its does not test their
meaningfulness.
There is an alternative methodology based upon other axioms
of choice. Language and logic and mathematics issue respectively
out of definitions, tautologies, and identities. Language and logic
are conjoined in the sense that language is somehow derived from
logic, whose truth functions stand prior to language and determine the senselessness of propositions. This is the argument of
Quine,3 and of Wittgenstein in the Tractatmus.4 It leads to the
view that once we have derived what, by analogy to Hohfeld's
language,' can be called fundamental logical conceptions, language and its usage may be tested by applying the laws of logic
as a yardstick or metwand to test the truth or falsity of linguistic statements, propositions, and the like. The usefulness of such
a test may depend on the completeness of the terms of the test
itself and on the applicability of the test to the subject tested.
Russell's account of the syllogism in A History of Western Philosophy is in point:6
Apart from such inferences as the above, Aristotle and his followers
thought that all deductive inference, when strictly stated, is syllogistic.
By setting forth all the valid kinds of syllogism, and setting out any
suggested argument in syllogistic form, it should therefore be possible
to avoid all fallacies.
This system was the beginning of formal logic, and, as such, was
both important and admirable. But considered as the end, not the
beginning, of formal logic, it is open to three kinds of criticism:
(1) Formal defects within the system itself.
(2) Over-estimation of the syllogism, as compared to other forms of
deductive argument.
(3) Over-estimation of deduction as a form of argument.

Hohfeld's analysis must be dealt with in some detail, not
merely because it is a remarkable attempt to reduce legal propositions to some form of logical synthesis, not merely because
it attempts to rid "le Mot Juridique" of its sens multiples, but
becautse it contains certain fundamental errors. These are (1) the
somewhat naive assumption that the logic of the system can
act as a yardstick or metwand, and (2) the very basis of the
2.

STRAWSON, INTRODUCTION To LOGIcAL THEORY (1952).

3. QuIns,

FRom A LOGICAL POinT OF VIEW ch. VI (1961).
LOGIco-PmPOSOPHICUS (1951).

4. WITTGENSTEiN, TRACTATUS

5. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
6. RussELl, A HISTORY OF

WESTERN

PHILOSOPHY 196-97 (1945).

ANALYSIS OF HOHFELD
analysis, which is some sort of desire to rid legal thought and
legal language of words that form too convenient a part of argument and judgment. An example is the attempt to describe contracts, options, etc. as jural relations. In describing the creation
of a logical language whose constituent elements are, in the order
of their enunciation, Names, Constants and variables, Functions,
Propositions and propositional functions, Improper symbols, connectives, Operators, quantifiers, the Logistic method, Syntax and
Semantics, Church points out the difficulty of describing logic
without using a meta-language. 7 By this he means that to make
explicit how his logical symbols work he must use some language
and by regression ultimately ordinary language.
Hohfeld fails to see that meta-languages must likewise be
used to describe his fundamental legal conceptions. He also ignores the necessity in the judicial process of one of the functions
performed by a meta-language, namely the translation of actions,
events, facts, situations, and things described in ordinary language into legal terminology 8 This may well be a haphazard, illogical, random process, a process contained in the rules of pleading and resulting in criteria that Hohfeld dismisses in delineating
the facts in issue.
There is some uncertainty as to the criteria he uses, or the
criteria that can be found for his use of "constitutive facts" and
"evidentiary facts." The rules of pleading prescribe that a party
must not plead evidence or law, although the latter rule dates
back to the middle of the nineteenth century. No distinction is
noted, if there is any distinction, in the judicial process at a time
when the special pleader was at the height of his practice, before
the ilary Rules of 1845 and before the 1868 edition of Bullen
and Leake ceased to be the most important book in the barrister's library. Holfeld, thus, fails in part to relate, describe, transform the "logical irregularities of language" when he makes his
logical translation into fundamental legal conceptions. 9
A reference to the procedure followed by logicians in setting up
an artificial language will provide a basis for a criticism of the
method of logical translation employed by Hohfeld. In his IntroTo M&THm&TICAL Lowec 1-68 (1956).
8. Berlin, Logical Translation, 50 PuOcnmGs op THE ABRSiToTux
7. CHURCH, INTRODUc no
SociETY 157 (1950).

9. Braithwaite shows what errors can be made in using scientific models

based upon different calculi.

BRarTHwAITE, ScmcrTixc EXPLATxO
n

93-90

Berlin also warns against this sort of error in general philosophy.
Berlin, pra note 8.
(1960).
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duction to Mathematical Logic, Church describes the procedure
to be used in setting up a formalized language. Initially, a familiar language, such as English, must be adopted, much as it
would be in writing a Latin grammar in English. The establishment of a formalized language, however, would require greater
precision in the statement of the rules of the formalized language,
with fewer irregularities and exceptions. Moreover, the construction of such a language would be activated by the "idea that the
rules of the language being constructed embody a theory or system of logical analysis."'
As Church indicates, the device of describing one language in
terms of another is used not only in constructing formalized languages but also in theorizing the objectives of a formalized language, since the theory behind the use and principle of a formalized language is often more important than its actual and
practical use as a language. When one language is employed to
talk about some other language, Church calls the latter the object
language and the former the meta-language."
In setting up a formalized language, accordingly, a certain portion of the English language, not limited by precise definitions,
would be employed as a meta-language. This meta-language
would be sufficiently flexible to permit a formulation of general
instructions for the manipulation of concrete physical objects. It
is thus a language that deals with matters of everyday human experience and that goes beyond such matters only in that no finite
upper limit is imposed on the number of objects that may be involved in any particular case, or on the time that may be required
for their manipulation according to instructions. 2
The new language, therefore, is not defined by translating its
expressions (sentences, names, forms) into corresponding English
expressions. As Church points out, this would impose the logically
unsatisfactory features of the English language on the new language. A more desirable approach is to obtain an uninterpreted
calculus or logistic system by excluding all considerations of
meaning from the purely formal part of the language.
Church has adopted a detailed method of realizing this objective. First he would specify the language by listing single, indivisible symbols, which he calls primitive symbols. A finite linear
10. CnuRcH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 47.
11. Id. at 47-58.
12. Church excludes those additional portions of English "which would
be used in order to treat of infinite classes or of various like abstract objccts
which are an essential part of the subject matter of mathematics." Ciwncn,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 48.

1963]

ANALYSIS OF HOHFELD

sequence of primitive symbols is called a formtda, and rules are
given by which certain formulas are designated well-formed formulas, to be regarded as the only genuine expressions of the language. After some of these well-formed formulas are chosen as
axioms, primitive rules of inference (or rules of procedure) are laid
down. From these rules, based on appropriate well-formed formulas, a well-formed formula is immediately inferred as a conclusion.n
A finite sequence of one or more well-formed formulas is called
a proof by Church, if each of these well-formed formulas is an
axiom or is immediately inferred from preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence by means of one of the rules of inference.
This scheme of delineating the primitive symbols of a logistic
system, the rules that transform certain formulas into well-formed
formulas, the rules of inference, and the axioms of the system is
Church's "primitive basis of the logistic system."'' 4
CRITICISM OF HOHFELD'S IMETA-LANGUAGE
I now wish to examine, and so criticize, the way in which Hohfeld derives his fundamental legal conceptions from the use of legal language, as found in judgments and textbooks. Hohfeld describes, in a Proustian or nonlegal manner, the operative facts that is, the facts, events, actions, and situations - of the case in
question, as follows' 5
Passing now to the field of contracts, suppose A mails a letter to B
11.

offering to sell the former's land, Whiteacre, to the latter for ten thousand dollars, such letter being duly received. The operative facts thus
far mentioned have created a power as regards B and a correlative liability as regards A. B, by dropping a letter of acceptance in the box,
has the power to impose potential or inchoate obligation ex contractu
on A and himself; and, assuming that the land is worth fifteen thousand
dollars, that particular legal quantity-the "power plus liability" relation between A and B -seems to be worth about five thousnad [sic]
dollars to B. The liability of A will continue for a reasonable time unless, in exercise of his power to do so, A previously extinguishes it by
that series of operative facts known as "revocation." These last matters
are usually described by saying that A's "offer" will "continue" or
"remain open" for a reasonable time, or for the definite time actually
specified, unless A previously "withdraws" or "revokes" such offer.

13. So long as we are dealing only with a logistic system that remains
uninterpreted, the terms such as "premise," "immediately infer," and "conelusion" have -only such meaning as is conferred upon them by the rules of
inference themselves.

14. CnucH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 50.
15. Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 49-50.
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This passage clearly demonstrates the sort of logical mistranslation which fosters the weakness in Hohfeld's conclusion that the
fundamental legal conceptions are those eight concepts, right,
duty, privilege, etc. "Between the conception and its articulation
is a gap which no logic can jump" might be an excuse for an account given by Einstein in relation to his own somewhat platonic
mode of thinking. It will hardly do to justify or excuse Hohfeld's
analysis in view of his own stringent requirements for the opinions and judgments of others.
Operative or constitutive facts should be considered no more
than the generalized description of a rule of law or a combination
of rules such as offer, acceptance, title, salvage, patent, men8 rea.
Hohfeld must really intend the same, although his description of
operative facts is obscure. For example, he states: "Thus, X, the
owner of ordinary personal property 'in a tangible object' has the
power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, power, immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandonment . ..."1,
Hohfeld describes the purposes of his analysis as entailing the
reduction of what seems to be simple into greater clarity by making more searching, complicated, and detailed inquiries and by
stating that, as a practical matter, his analysis will help in deciding legal cases.' 7 It was Hohfeld's submission that the "right kind
of simplicity" could result only from a more thorough and selective analysis. His stated purpose was not "merely philosophical."
Rather, he chose to emphasize "certain oft-neglected matters,"
with the intention of facilitating an understanding and solution
of the practical problems of the law. With this end in view, he
was chiefly concerned with the basic conceptions of the law "the legal elements that enter into all types of jural interests."
Hohfeld began by stating two reasons for the inveterate failure
to distinguish between the legal and nonlegal components of a given
problem. First, the mental processes involved in physical and mental relations on one hand and purely legal relations on the other,
are extremely difficult to differentiate. A second reason was the ambiguity and looseness of legal terminology, of which he gave the
following illustration.'
16. Id. at 45.
17. Whether this statement is intended to be an assumption or a proof is

unclear.
18. Id. at 21-22.
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The word "property" furnishes a striling example. Both with lawyers
and with laymen this term has no definite or stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to which various
legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again-with far greater dis-

crimination and accuracy-

the word is used to denote the legal inter-

est-(or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical object.
Frequently there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one meaning
to the other. At times, also, the term is used in such a "blended" sense
as to convey no definite meaning whatever.

Hohfeld also points out the evils of "figurative" and "metaphorical" uses- that is, the confusion of the thing and the aggregate of rights connected with, or related to, the thing. This is
a practice inveterate in law, and Pollock and Maitland' and Chalis'2have marked the distinction. Whether this sort of anthropomorphism and personification can now be usefully removed is
questionable. This matter will be considered later.
Hohfeld next discusses the same point with respect to contract,
in which he elaborates the distinction between constitutive facts
and the jural relation, without disclosing any distinguishing criteria between one set of jural relations, grounded in a set of constitutive facts, and another set of jural relations, grounded in the
same set of constitutive facts. For example, no standards are established to determine whether an action lies in contract or in
tort, or whether the facts support a contract or an estoppel. Moreover, the distinction between, and the criteria for deriving, constitutive facts and evidential facts are left unclarified. Hohfeld defined "Operative, constitutive, causal, or 'dispositive' facts" as
those which, "under the general legal rules that are applicable,
suffice to change legal relations, that is, either to create a new relation, or to extinguish an old one, or to perform both of these
21
functions simultaneously."
The definition of operative or constitutive facts is also unclear.
It seems to import the generalized statement of rules of law rather
as a textbook would make propositions about law. They are
somewhat aphoristic and have value only insofar as they relate to
the rest of the law, and Hohfeld seems to realize this in the next
suggestion that negative operative facts are important. Negative
operative facts are no more than those facts of law, generalized
somewhat aphoristically, which are omitted from the propositions contained in the operative or constitutive facts. The exam19. E.g., 2 PoILocK & fArLAND, HSTORy OF ENGIrrSH LAW 3-4, 32 (2d
ed. 1898).
20. CTHAlLs, REAL PaoPERn
1-3 (Sd ed. 1911).
21. Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 25.
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ples Hohfeld gives illustrate this and we might ask why the rest
of the law should not be given as examples of nonoperative facts,
for propositions of law are relative and so correlated that they
are understood within the complex of their relations but cannot
be isolated and explained outside this complex. The laws are
merely functions in a calculus. Now let us look at one of Hoh22
feld's examples:
For example, in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and
B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties
is a human being, that each of them has lived for not less than a
certain period of time, (is not "under age"), that A has made an "offer,"
that B has "accepted" it, etc. It is sometimes necessary to consider,
also, what may, from the particular point of view, be regarded as
negative operative facts. Thus, e.g., the fact that A did not wilfully
misrepresent an important matter to B, and the fact that A had not
"revoked" his offer, must really be included as parts of the totality of
operative facts in the case already put.

That operative and indeed nonoperative facts are no more than
generalized statements of legal rules appears from Hohfeld's suggestion that possession, capacity, domicile, etc., are generic forms
of operative facts. Why "possession" is generic or more generic, if
that is possible, than "offer" is difficult to understand, and Hohfeld gives no criteria for his use of the Aristotelian formula from
which specific and generic adjectives are derived. He states, for
example, that in many situations "a single convenient term is employed to designate (generically) certain miscellaneous groups of
operative facts which, though differing widely as to their individual 'ingredients,' have, as regards a given matter, the same net
force and effect. ' 2 He further stated that, when employed with
"discrimination," the term "possession" was a word of this character as was the term "capacity," the term "domicile," etc.
Hohfeld next attempts to distinguish between operative facts
and the time honored phrase, "facts in issue," a term of art pleaders use to describe how, out of the averments in the pleadings,
the issue on the facts was formulated. In other words, what constitutes the res gestae. The distinction between res gestae and evidence is well thought out, as are the rules of pleading. We know
that since 1875 the law cannot be pleaded, and evidence could
never be pleaded. How the res gestae is pleaded is partly a matter
of art and partly a matter of law. What is relevant to the issue is
the broad rule embodying the criteria for the materiality and particularity of averments. Hohfeld's suggestions do not seem to
22. Id. at 25-26.
23. Id. at 28.
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strike at the point, nor does he prescribe any criteria upon which
to make the distinction between operative facts and the facts in
issue. It might be that operative facts, are merely those generalized
rules of law that describe the facts in issue. If this were so it might
be said that operative facts describe both the facts in issue and
the evidential facts, for once ascertained from the evidence relevant to the issue, the evidential facts describe in some way or, as
lawyers would say, prove the facts in issue. It should be reiterated that here there is no absolute and rigidly logical test, for the
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance to the issue, and
the issue depends in part on the facts and in part on the law. A
lawyer, in advising upon a case or settling the pleadings, continually shifts his attention from the facts to the law and from the
law to the facts. How far this intellectual gymnastic can be directed by strict logic is difficult to assess. After all, thinking is not
a philosophical activity, but psychological or physiological. The
following quotation from Hohfeld should indicate why the above
criticisms have been leveled against him: 4
In passing, it may not be amiss to notice that the term, "facts in
issue," is sometimes used in the present connection. If, as is usual, the
term means "facts put in issue by the pleadings," the expression is an
unfortunate one. The operative facts alleged by the pleadings are more
or less generic in character; and if the pleadings be sufficient, only such
generic operative facts are "put in issue." The operative facts of real
life are, on the other hand, very specific. That being so, it is clear that
the real and specific facts finally relied on are comparatively seldom put
in issue by the pleadings.... A common fallacy in this connection is
to regard the specific operative facts established in a given case as being
but "evidence" of the generic (or "ultimate") operative facts alleged in
the pleadings.
An evidential fact is one which, on being ascertained, affords some
logical basis -not conclusive- for inferring some other fact. The latter
may be either a constitutive fact or an intermediate evidential fact. Of
all the facts to be ascertained by the tribunal, the operative are, of
course, of primary importance; the evidential are subsidiary in their
functions.2 5

24. Id. at 26-27.
25. It has already been noted that an "operative fact" is any fact the
existence or occurrence of which will cause new legal relations between persons. If some repetition may be forgiven, Hohfeld insisted that a clear distinction should always be observed between the physical phenomena and the
legal relations consequent thereon. The former were the world of the senses,
the latter are intellectual conceptions. Operative facts were sometimes described by him as "investitive," "constitutive," "causal," and "dispositive."
In Hohfield's system the "extinguishment" of a legal relation is necessarily
the creation of a new one. See Corbin, Legal AnalIysis and Terminology, 29
YALE

L.J. 163 (1919).
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As has been indicated, however, the clear-cut distinctions between
operative facts and evidentiary facts, between facts and law,
which Hohfeld insisted upon, are not and cannot be made in
practice.
The analogy of a meta-language is useful to show some of the
difficulties which Hohfeld does not seem to have resolved in his
use of operative or constitutive facts and negative operative
facts. The examples he gives in describing the operative facts of a
contract seem to correspond to the descriptive requirements of
any textbook on the law of contract. Pollock,2 for example, describes offer and acceptance by using technical legal words, intermingled with words of ordinary language. Suppose a textbook is
written so succinctly as Withers' Reminders on Reversions or
Gover on Title, where every descriptive statement looks like a
rule of law. These statements supposedly would be the operative
facts in a situation where the acts, events, and situations are all
subsumable, abstractable, or somehow describable under an established rule of law, precisely and completely articulated in legal
language. Yet, it is very rare, if indeed it is at all possible, that
this should be the case. The following case would be of this order:
An infant domiciled in France offers a lunatic resident of the
United Kingdom, but domiciled in New York State, a chattel
real situate in Scotland at a price certain, which he accepts. Now
if these are the operative facts, their logico-legal translation would
entail reference to French law, English law, Scots law and the law
of the state of New York, all private, international, and domestic
law.
Examples of capacity, infancy, and domicile have been deliberately chosen because it is not clear whether Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions, the bare matrix of correlatives and jural opposites, right, duty, privilege, no right, etc. adequately describe
what, in Roman law, was a large bulk of jurisprudence - the law
of persons. Again, whether an equally important part of Roman
law and early English law, the law of actions, can adequately be
described by this matrix is questionable. The bare statement that
right is the correlative of duty and the opposite of no right explains nothing. Even if we search for right, duty, no right and
privilege, power, immunity, liability and disability within the judicially defined language of the law, or in the other authorities
of the law, the legal game as played by judges and jurisconsults
alike will add nothing to an understanding of the construct of
these fundamental legal conceptions.
26. POLLOCK, P RnCIPLES OF CONTRACT (13th ed. 1950).
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Even Wittgenstein's ukase "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for
the use" will reveal neither the meaning nor the use, nor indeed
the usage of these fundamental legal conceptions in all those rules
-that describe the placita legum of, say, English law or Roman
law. This is simply because, within these jurisprudential systems,
powers, rights, and duties, for example, are described more after
the manner of Salmond2 7 than of Hlohfeld. Lord Lindley's opinion
in Quinn v. Leatham,8 so criticised by Hohfeld, at least illustrates
legal usage. From legal language, then, it is not possible to derive
Hokfeld's bare matrix without the use of a meta-language, in
Church's sense of the word as described above.
Indeed, Hohifeld has to resort to such a meta-language to explain his matrix and how it works. There is nothing objectionable
in this procedure, so long as it is realized that there are different
levels of logic, that there are first, second, and third order statements, and that there are hidden difficulties in making logical
translations, and so in making linguistic translations. In considering how far Hohfeld's matrix does for a logico-legal language what
the truth functions of logic do for ordinary language, Hohfeld's
meta-language must be analyzed.
Before analyzing Holifeld's meta-language, however, another
method of deriving logic from legal language deserves mention. It
has been suggested that the verbal forms of legal statements
should be analyzed, and their fumdamental constructs revealed by
reducing the statements to primitive, in Russell's sense, relations.
Section 1 of the Larceny Act (1916) or section 40 of the Law of
Property Act (1925) could be reduced to such forms, and the
terms "must," "may," "ought," "it is forbidden," may form the
basis of legal utterance. This procedure is, to some extent, related
to the lessons of legal history from Maitland's aphorism on the
forms of action, Dr. Glanville Williams' "Foundations of Tortious
Liability,"2 9 and Professor Daube's Forms of Roman Le lation 0
Professor Daube distinguishes between conditional and relative
clauses, imperative and infinitive, the distinction between opportere and necesse est. He also draws a distinction between the concept "right" and "duty," not from any correlation or opposition
of these legal concepts, but from the mode of their expression.
'Hence it [opportere]may refer not only to what is necessary, to
27. SAr.moND,

JuusrauiENcE

(7th ed. 1924);

SAL.uoN,,

JuisnumDcE

(Williams ed., 11th ed. 1957).
28. [1901] A.C. 495, 564 (per Lord Lindley).
29. Williams, Foundation of Tortious Liability, 7 Cam.L.
So. DAUBE, Foiyms OF IOAwN LErIsLATIoN 12 (1956).

111 (1939).
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duties, but also to what is permitted, to rights."' This method
of form criticism Professor Daube has applied to possession, in
his "Concerning the Classification of Interdicts. ' ' 32 It leads to the
germ of an idea stated by Mr. Cohen,88 that it may be more
fruitful to create a modal logic by reference to "may" and "must"
than to create some bare matrix of rights, duties, etc.
In the Ship Money 4 case, an early use of form criticism appears. The issue in that case was whether the statute De Tallagio 8 was a statute, since it was not entered on the Parliament
roll. The court resolved the issue by referring to the fact that De
Tallagio contains the words statutum est. If the form of a verb,
or as in this case, the words used in the statuere, rather than the
constituere sense, can help to determine a legal concept, and Maitland86 is full of talk about the use of words in early English law,
a systemic analysis of the words used in legal decision, after the
manner of Russell and Whitehead's procedure in Principia lathematica,8 7 may yield a fruitful account of the logic of the law. The
usefulness of comparative law is unclear, and, as in other disciplines, alternate logics and alternate geometries may be found,
or, indeed, alternate theories which are at the moment irreconcilable, such as relativity theory and quantum mechanics. Moreover, legal usage may be so random and undisciplined that no
logic can be derived from it.
Hohfeld's "fundamental legal conceptions" and the meta-language he uses may now be defined and described. He begins as
follows:
The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui generi;

and thus it is that attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether useless. Accordingly, the most promising line

of procedure seems to consist in exhibiting all of the various relations
in a scheme of "opposites" and "correlatives," and then proceeding to

31. Ibid.
S2. Daube, Concerning the Classification of Interdicts, 6 REvUE
NATIONALE DEs DROITS DE L'ANTIQUE 23

INTER-

(1951).

33. Cohen, Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence,in 29 SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND JuIsPituDENCE 213 (1955).
34. King v. Hampden, 3 State Trials 825 (Ex. 1637) (Howell ed. 1816).
35. 1297, 25 Edw. 1, cs. 5, 6.
36. E.g., 2 POLLOCK & MAIuTmM, supra note 7, at 29, 30, 228, 571.
37. RUSSELL & WHITEHEAD, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (2d ed. 1925).
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exemplify their individual scope and application in concrete cases. An
effort will be made to pursue this method:

Jural Opposites
11Right
no-right

privilege
duty

Jural Correlatives
I right
privilege
duty
no-right

power
disability

immunity
liability

power
liability

immunity
disability

Rights and Duties. As already intimated, the term "rights" tends
to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given case may be a
privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense; and this
looseness of usage is occasionally recognized by
38
the -authorities.

At the outset, Hohfeld's procedure seems to be optimistic, but
the use of "exemplify" here, considering the cases cited, is somewhat curious, for the Correlatives and Opposites do not square
with the authorities. Hohfeld seems pre-Eminenty, and perhaps
properly, concerned with the inconsistencies of judicial usage and
definition. Whether this matrix would be more illuminating if it
reconciled in some logical scheme these differing uses instead of
distinguishing them, will remain to be seen. He cites the lexicographer Walker's definition of "right" as the starting point of his
discussion, and this only illustrates the richness of the usage of
the word "right."3' 9 A juristic, linguistic analyst or phenomenalist
would, after the manner of Professor Austin's procedure in his
lecture on 'Excuses," 40 thumb through the dictionary searching
out the entries under "property, interest, power, prerogative,
immunity, privilege," which constitute Walker's definition of
"right." Having done this, he would test, in judicial language or
in the language of the legal game, the appropriate uses of these
words, in an attempt to discover under what conditions they are
characteristically used. "Right" would therefore be contrasted
with not merely "privilege," "power," and "immunity," but with
"property," "interest," "prerogative," etc. Hohfeld's comment on
the dictionary defifition is in itself ambiguous. Yet he appears to
criticize it because of its "ambiguity."
Ambiguity, as Professor Hart has pointed out, is not the only
38. Hohifeld, supra note 5, at 30.
39. Ibid.
40. Ausrm, op. cit. supra note 1.
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source of difficulty in legal language. 4 "Words are, of course,
vague; they have only a core of settled meaning, and beyond that
a penumbra of borderline cases which is not regimented by any
conventions. . . . Words are also ambiguous, that is, they have
more than one relatively well settled use." In Professor Hart's example, a testator leaves his "vessels" to his son: 42 "If one wants to
know whether this includes his flying-boat, it is the vagueness of
'vessel' which is the source of the trouble; but if the question is
whether the bequest refers to the testator's boats or his drinkingcups, then ambiguity is responsible" for the confusion. Whether
vagueness or ambiguity lies at the bottom of Hohfeld's examples
is questionable, and when Hohfeld sets out his matrix he may be
giving the word "right" or "duty" such an artificial construction
that he is performing some linguistic translation that he does not
or cannot describe. "Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and
indiscriminate use of the term, 'right,' what clue," he asks, "do we
find, in ordinary legal discourse, toward limiting the word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning"?4" Yet Hohfeld leaves
unstated his criteria for definite and appropriate meaning.
It is consonant with legal usage that "right," as Professor
OF

41. Hart, Dias and Hughes on Jurisprudence, 4 J. Soc. PuBLic TEACheS
L. (n.s.), 143, 144 (1958). Professor Hart also discusses other "cardinal

features of language" which are relevant in the present context.
Thirdly: We are tempted, when we are faced with words, to look
round for just one thing or quality for which the word is supposed to
stand. It is often wise to resist this temptation. Perhaps the words

stand not merely for one kind of thing but for a range of diverse,
though related things. We should not assume whenever we use the
expression "possession" that this must on all occasions refer to the same
state of affairs, and the same is true of words like "crime" and "law"
itself. Moreover, words like "right" and "duty" do not directly stand
for any states of affairs.
Fourthly: For any account descriptive of any thing or event or state

of affairs, it is always possible to substitute either a more specific or a
more general description ....

Fifthly: Obsession with the notion that words must always stand for
the same "qualities" or the same set of qualities whenever they are
used has stimulated two contrapuntal tendencies. The first is to insist
that words like "possession" or "law" must, in spite of appearance,

stand always for the same common qualities and the diversity is only
apparent: this leads to the imposition on the diversity of the facts of a
spurious "constructive" or fictitious unity. The second tendency is to
insist that only some one of the range of cases in which a word is used
is the proper or "real" meaning of the word ....

Id. at 144-45.
42. Ibid.
43. Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 31.
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Daube has pointed out, entails the notion of "it is permitted"
and "duty," "it is necessary." When Hohfeld states the clue, he
admittedly correlates "right" with "duty," but in doing so, he
has to describe the correlation in a meta-language. How far he
can be said to have empirically derived this correlation from the
cases is unclear, particularly when he is driven to show that the
opinion of Lord :Lindley in Quinn v. Leatlum"4 is inconsistent
with his own matrix. This conclusion seems to conflict with Hohfeld's statement, recognizing as he must that broad and indiscriminate use of the word "right." For this would seem to direct
an analysis of its many uses, rather than a mere recognition of
the random indeterminacy of the word and a subsequent confinement within the limits of his own matrix. It is significant that
the answer to his question is derived from a "clue," and that clue
is said to be "duty." 45
[l]t is certain that even those who use the word and the conception
"right" in the broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of
"duty" as the invariable correlative. As said in Lake Shore & M.S.R.
Co. v. Kurtz. 6
"A duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought
not to do. 'Duty' and 'right' are correlative terms. When a
right is invaded, a duty is violated."

It might be observed parenthetically that "ought" in this case
does not correspond with Professor Daube's "It is necessary"
("opportere"), which sometimes seems best translated by "must."
Hohfeld then illustrates,
rather than exemplifies, his argument
47
with the following caseY
[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to
stay off the place.

This example, for which no authority is cited, looks more like
an illustration. It describes, in the language of ordinary speech, a
situation without any constitutive facts and seems to effect Hohfeld's own criteria of judging not of "material facts" but jural relations. If a contract is functus officii as soon as it is concluded
and gives rise to legal relations, we must ask the same sort of
question about "staying off the place."
In.considering the linguistic formula that will follow the words
"right" and "duty" to illustrate that they are correlatives, two
44. Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] A.C. 495, 564 (per Lord Lindley).
45. Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 81-82.
46. 10 Ind.App. 60, 37 N.E. sos (1894).
47. "Hohfeld, mpra note 5, at 82.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:313

contrapuntal criticisms may be made. The first is to ask what
sort of verb is represented or contained in "right" or "duty," and
must it always be of the same form, say, "may" and "must"?
Radn's s restatement of Hohfeld employs the sort of verbs which
may be consistently used in relation to the fundamental legal
conception, primarily because Radin doubts that Hohfeldian language represents judicial language. Corbin, in his restatement of
Hohfeld, uncritically transposes "right," "duty," "power," etc. in
linguistic formulae of verbs.49 Dr. Glanville Williams questions
the validity of Hohfeld's terminology, for reasons similar to those
expressed by Radin ° He suggests substituting the word "liberty" for "privilege," and he further suggests that in the discussion of "privilege," Hohfeld goes wrong. The immediate purpose
of citing this Article is to show what caution must be exercised in
making what may be called logico-legal translations and in propounding a test which Dr. Williams puts thus:5
[I]n arguing from a concept to its correlative, the content of the con-

cept must not be changed ....
Wherever there is the possibility of
fallacy, the content of the right should be stated in the same language
as the content of the correlative duty, and vice versa. If the verbal
formula be changed, this may give rise to the suspicion that the content of the concept has been changed, and consequently that there is
a flaw in the reasoning.
To test whether an alleged "right" is a right in the strict sense, ask
whether it has a legal duty correlative to it, and keep to the same formula when stating the duty ...

Applying this test, Dr. Williams goes on to show that the phrase
"right of way" is a logical misnomer, since no correlative duty attaches to the person against whom the right may be exercised. 2
48. Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HAnv. L. REV. 1141 (1938).
49. Corbin, supra note 25.
50. Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 CoLuM. L. REV. 1129
(1956).
51. Id. at 1144-45.
52.
Thus it is fallacious to argue that the "right" of a licensee to go upon
land is correlative to a duty on the occupier not to set traps. Similarly
the "right of way" (as, by way of easement) is not a right, because
there is no duty of way. A person entitled to a right of way has not a
right to walk, because the other is under no duty that he shall walk.
If the dominant owner decides to stay at home and not walk, this
would be no tort to the servient owner. The "right of way" is a liberty
of way combined with the ordinary right not to be assaulted when
exercising it and a right not to have the way obstructed.
There is another method of showing that "right of way" is a misnomer. No one ever has a right to do something; he only has a right
that some one else shall do (or refrain from doing) something. In other
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In equating "right" and "may," "duty" and "must," "power"
and "can," RadinO makes a useful point, but if he merely restates
Hotkfeld's substantive fundamental legal conceptions in a linguistic formula of verbal parts of speech, he may establish an empirical method without actually using it. This empirical method
will derive from the way law or rules of law are stated in ordinary
language; that is, the ordinary legal language partaking of the
particular logic of the legal game. This, again, is what any logical
account of the law must be based on, and a Russellian program,
that is, the method of PrincipiaMathematica, must be adopted
to derive the logic of the law. As noted above, the method outlined by Church is the one that should be followed.
I adin translates the essentials of Hotifeld's system of analysis
into four basic forms.5
I.
B ought to do a particular act that A desires him to do....
TI.
B may refrain from doing a particular act that A desires him to do.
II.
B ought to refrain from a particular act that A does not desire him
to do...
IV.
B may do a particular act that A does not desire him to do.
These formulas are taken to be exhaustive and that they are exhaustive is one of the foundations of the system of analysis here presented.
Radin also points out that the first form could be expressed in
terms of A's right against B, and the second in terms of B's right
against A. He further asserts that these rights are quite dissimilar,
in that the first is in the form of a demand, while the second
might be called a privilege, liberty, or license. Yet, in legal literature, these terms generally are not used in the Hohfeldian sense.
In the discussion of Hotkfeld's own matrix, certain arguments
for preferring "liberty" to "privilege" will be explored. As has been
suggested, judicial usage and the language of legal literature are
too encrusted with unrestricted uses of "rights" and "duties" to
words, every right in the strict sense relates to the conduct of another,
while a liberty and a power relate to the conduct of the holder of the
liberty or power. A statement that a person has a right to do something generally means that he has a right in the strict sense not to be
interfered with in doing it.
Ibid.
53. Radin, supra note 48, at 1147-51.
54. Id. at 1147-49.
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fit any refined linguistic formula as arbitrary as "rights," "duties,"

"privileges," "powers," "liberties," "prerogatives," and "subjection." A linguistically analytical method, however, would reveal
the hard lineaments of the central core of meaning, and having
exposed the conditions under which it has its particular use, its
proper use should also appear. This should suffice to prevent the
unclearness, obfuscation, and obscurantism of judicial language.
Thus, self-discipline, rather than a restatement of old rules in
new terms, is needed. If a logic is to be derived from the law, then
a logic written in a new symbolism, freed from the overtones and
undertones, the pastiche and melanges, of ordinary words of every
day judicial utterance should be used. Such a symbolic logic
needs a symbolic language to remove the difficulty, the vagueness, and the ambiguity of legal language.
Yet this symbolism will, like that of Russell, suffer from the
stultifying reduction of words into the symbolism. For legal
words, like ordinary language, have an open texture and are built
upon different logics and have different strata. For example, Wittgenstein's Green is Green was translated into Berkley's paradox
"I never read nor heard, that Lex was Rex; but it is common and
most true, that Rex is Lex, for he is 'lex loquens,' a living, a
speaking, an acting law: and because the king is 'lex loquens,'
therefore it is said, that 'rex censetur habere omnia jura in scrinio
pectoris sui.' "" There is a richness about words which a symbolic
language does not, because it is not expected to, translate. This
richness of ordinary language is imported into legal language, so
that the word "right" includes "liberties," "powers," "privileges,"
"prerogatives," "interest," etc. Perhaps the task is to discover
how the uses of these words blend into one another, rather than
to create artificial central cores of meaning, by reference to correlatives and jural opposites which themselves entail several tinclarified words.
Bacon's "garland of the prerogative," in the Assize Broumeloe
v. Michell, 6 included those things that the king complained were
the subject matter of legal decision "more lately, than in the time
of her late Majesty," that is to say his powers, privileges, prerogatives, and titles. Prerogative is used to explain the meaning of
"right" in the reference to Walker's dictionary, quoted by Hohfeld. It is as hallowed in royal and ancient usage as "liberties" or
"privileges," and how far it should receive some support in its
55. King v. Hampden, 3 State Trials 825, 1098 (Ex. 1637) (Howell ed.
1816).
56. 1 Rolle 188,288, 81 Eng. Rep. 421,490 (K.B. 1617).
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claim to be a fundamental legal conception is something not canvassed in the literature. It does have some claim, although the
prerogative of the crown could be thought to include all the
fundamental legal conceptions. Yet in some senses, it is as much
a right in rem, in the classic language of the law. The prerogatives to imprison per specialemandatum domini regis,to proclaim
law, and to pardon, for example, apply generally, like a duty in
tort as defined by Professor Winfield. 7 Similarly, seventeenth century thought on the liberties of the individual and the charter of
liberties, included claims concerning absoluta proprietasin goods
and land, which look like rights. The distinction Professor Berlin
propounds in political theory, namely two concepts of liberty liberty to and liberty froms - may also apply to legal language.
Moreover, reducing the relative functions of all matters in that
complex calculus of the law to a simple matrix of eight fundamental legal conceptions, each conception being written in a word
of inordinately emotive content, seems indeed to be a labyrinthine
meandering through an ingens 8ilVa.59
Dr. Glanville Williams in his Article on "The Concept of Legal
that "correlative" is sometimes confused with
Liberty" suggests
"corollary' 80 A correlative, according to Dr. Williams, is one of
two things having a reciprocal relation such that one of them necessarily implies, or is complementary to, the other; for example,
husband-wife, parent-child, and right-duty. A corollary, on the
other hand, is an immediate deduction from a given proposition,
generally so obvious as not to require separate proof.
The use of "correlative" is, therefore, not entirely accurate,
57. Wnam n, TORTS 7-9 (Lewis ed. 1954).
58. Berlin, Logical Translation, 50 PnocEnEnos OF

THE AmsoITaaA

SocIET 157 (1950).
59.
It is in the relation of these terms to each other that Hohfeld's

terminology is most in need of revision. He spoke of A's right and B's
duty in 1, as "correlatives" of each other. The difficulty in the use of
this term is not merely terminological.... The difficulty arises from
the fact that Hohfeld really regarded them as correlatives, that is to
say, as two separate things united to each other. The union was, to be
sure, indissoluble, but the two were none the less separable in discourse, if not in fact.
But that was error and a sin against the very analysis he was attempting. It gives a kind of reality to mere words which they must
not be allowed, if we hope to reach realism in law. It also permits a
specious and false emphasis to be placed on duties as against rights.
Iladin, supranote 48, at 1149-50.
60. Williams, supra note 50.
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and a study of the use of the word "opportere" in Roman law, as
Professor Daube explains in his Forms of Roman Legislation, is
productive of two ramifications. One has already been suggested,
namely that opportere might at one time mean "must," entailing
"duty," and at another, "may," entailing "right," and whether
"must" and "may" are correlative, can hardly be resolved without the criteria necessary to decide the question."1 This Hohfeld
does not provide. The other ramification is that opportere could
mean many other things, such as "it is fitting" or "it is needful."
This entails a distinction between fas and ius. As duty, right, fas
and ius could all be derived from opportere there seems no reason
why "duty" should not be a correlative of "ius" and "right" the
correlative of "fas"; and yet "fas," having as it does the overtone
of older religious and moral reference, is more akin to "duty"
while "ius" seems more akin to "right." "Droit" in French law
means, indeed, both "law" and "right," and "ius" itself, in the
phrase "ius civil" or "ius gentium," means "law." There is no reason to suppose that these overtones found in the Roman law are
not present to some degree in modem jurisprudence. Certainly
Becquart has found them in Les mots a sense multiples dans le
Droit Civil Francais2
Corbin explains correlatives and opposites as follows: 03
Correlatives

right
duty

privilege
no-right

power
liability

immunity
disability

Each pair of correlatives must always exist together; when some person
(A) has one of the pair, another person (B) necessarily has the other.
One of the terms expresses the relation of A to B; the other term expresses the relation of B to A.

It is significant that Corbin uses the word "necessarily" in respect
of "correlative." The force of "necessarily," "necessary," and "necessity," however, is left undisclosed. If it is logically necessary,
then the Holifeldian analysis seems somewhat trivial, for under
the guise of an all-embracing series of jural relations contained in
the eight fundamental legal conceptions, he uses only one truth
found in one of the two truth functions, material implication and
entailment, but his discussion does not make clear which.
The correlatives seem then to amount to this:
"If right then duty" and
"If privilege then no-right."
61. DAUBE, op. cit. supra note 80, at 12.
62. BECQUART, LES MOTS A SENS MULTIPLE DANS LE

cAIs (1928).
63. Corbin, upra note 25, at 166.
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Or, perhaps right entails duty and privilege entails no-right. The
jural opposites will comprise material non-implication or perhaps
non-entailment, and will then amount to this:
right
privilege

but not
but not

no-right
duty

This suggests that legal rules may comprise other logical functions. 4 Reference to Church's Introduction to Mathematical
LogiO65 will reveal the richness of even the formal languages with
which logicians axe concerned.
Hohfeld's insistence on keeping "rights" distinct from "privileges," "liberties," "powers," etc., and in keeping "privileges"
distinct from "liberties," "licenses," etc., not only ignores the judicial usage that blends and blurs, perhaps not without significance, these different concepts, but he also fails to notice that
there may be some logical relationship between "rights," "privileges," "powers," and "immunities," and these may be expressed
in the truth functions. Where, for example, "rights" and "privileges" axe blended in judicial language it is conceivable that disjunction-alternation might be used inclusively as follows:
(
v
) Rights or privileges (or both);
and where rights and privileges are used as identical words or
equivalences, equivalence may be used as follows:
(.
--) Rights if and only if privilegesP s
64.
So called modal concepts might conveniently be divided into three
or four main groups. There are the alethic modes or modes of truth.
These are concepts such as the necessary (the necessarily true), the possible (the possibly true), and the contingent (the contingently true).
There are the epistemic modes or modes of knowing. These are concepts such as the verified (that which is known to be true), the undecided, and the falsified (that which is known to be false). There are
the deontic modes or modes of obligation. These are concepts such as
the obligatory (that which we ought to do), the permitted (that which
we axe allowed to do), and the forbidden (that which we must not do).
As a fourth main group of modal categories one might add the existential modes or modes of existence. These are concepts such as universality, existence, and emptiness (of properties or classes).
There are essential similarities but also characteristic differences
between the various groups of modalities. They all deserve, therefore,
a special treatment.
WmGHT, Deontic Logic, in LOGIcAL SrTuns 58 (1957). My question is what
are the modalities of legal language and my suggestion is that there is a legal
logic similar to the outline of the deontie logic which Wright describes.
65. CHURCh, op. cit. supranote 7.

66. The use of the English words "if," "implies," "equivalent" in these
jural readings must not be taken as indicating that the meanings of
these English words are faithfully reproduced in the table.
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In discussing privileges and no-rights, however, Holifeld states
that "a privilege is the opposite of a duty, the correlative of a 'noright,' -67 and emphasizes that the duty, of which the privilege is
a negation, "is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite
68
to that of the privilege in question.1
This is a somewhat odd use of negation and any justification
for its oddity should be found in the cases Hohfeld cites in support of his jural opposites "right," "no-right," "privilege," and
"duty." To ask what it is like not to be X, when you seem fairly
certain what it is like to be X, is a useful question in philosophy,
as Professor Austin continually points out. It is not at all clear,
however, that jural opposites or mere negation ask this sort of
question. Significantly, there is no word for the jural opposite of
"right." While the assertion that nomina &untconsequentiarerum,
that where there is a word for it, there "it" is, or that where
there is no word for it, there is no "it," may be no more than a
pure nominalism, the fact that there is no judicial usage for the
expression of "no-right" probably stems from the absence of such
a conception.
Some brief remarks about Hohfeld's discussion of the judicial
process can appropriately be made at this point. He ascribes to
Pollock a view of jural relations that is discernible from his views
on law and the judicial process6 9 Hokfeld's fundamental legal
conceptions likewise exhibit a view of the law derived from the
American realist position that laws are the predictions of what
the courts will do. This is a sort of intellectualised construction of
67.

In the example last put, whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the
other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of
entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty
to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay
off.
Hohfeld, supra note 5, at 32-383.
68.
Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on
the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both
the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is
perfectly consistent with this sort of duty,- for the latter is of the
same content or tenor as the privilege;- but it still holds good that,
as regards Y, X's privilege of entering is of the precise negation of a
duty to stay off. Similarly, if A has not contracted with B to perform
certain work for the latter, A's privilege of not doing so is the very
negation of a duty of doing so. Here again the duty contrasted is of
a content or tenor exactly opposite to that of the privilege.

Ibid.
69. Id. at 42 n.59.

ANALYSIS OF HOHFELD
Coke's answer to the King and his counsel in the case of Commendams "that when that case should
be, he would do that
' 70
[which] should be fit for a judge to do"
Another matter for comment is Hohfeld's method of ignoring
judicial pronouncements where they appear to contradict his formal scheme, while relying on them as somehow justifying his
choice of words, such as his preference for "privilege" over "liberty." This is a minor criticism, but as has been shown, the vagueness which Hohfeld attributes to judicial pronouncement is inherent in the judicial process, the nature of the judicial decision, and
the ratiocination, rather than the logic, upon which the law is
based.
If, as Maitland thought,"' "rights" spring from remedies, it is
not surprising that the rules which spring from "rights" do not
prescribe for cases where there are no rights. In the same sense
of non curat in the maxim de minimis non curat lex, the law does
not concern itself with that aspect of facts, events, actions, situations, where the law gives no remedy. Kocourek refers to the
"anomaic" 72 in this sense, as did Bacon, when speaking of powers
to impose taxes: "If they are illegal try them in the courts, if they
are legal but grievous propound them in .Parliament"'7 3
The law of England and the law of the United States recognize
no absolute ownership, since no judgments are in rem, except perhaps an action in rem against a ship. Because no judgments affect
the world at large, but take effect interpartes and are res judicata
only as between the litigants, these systems of law afford only a
better "right" or "title," or at most the best "right" or "title.'
Thus, reference to A's right or privilege or power or prerogative
over a thing in respect of the world at large is outside the framework of legal conceptual analysis. At best, the paradigm case is
that inter parte, and occasionally it is inter partes plus some not
privy to the case but somehow bound by it. At all events it is
never general. It is for this reason that Winfield's definition of
tort as a breach of a duty owed generally is difficult to square
70. 5 SPEDDIxG, THE LETTES AND LIrE or LORD BAcoN 367 (1869).
71. 1 PoLwcK & M-rLAxD, HmTony or ENGLis- L&w 360, 480 (2d ed.
1898).
72. Kocotm, JunAL RELT Ows ch. X § 3 (2d ed. 1928).
73. "And according to these several natures of grievance, there be several
remedies. Be they against law? Overthrow them by judgment. Be they too
straight and extreme, though legal? Propound them in Parliament." Bacon,
Argument by the King's Solicitor, in the Lower House of Parliament, in
1610, for Impositions by the Crown, 2 State Trials 896 (Howell ed 1816).
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with those cases that form the foundation of tortious liability. 4
To paraphrase the language of Dr. Donne, preaching before the
King at Whitehall, 7 5 the law proceeds legally but its publication
before and after judgment is not manifest to all. If the law is accepted as an unpredictable, complex calculus of rules, axioms,
maxims, cases, out of which are discernible or derivable constants,
variables, and functions, the primary concern must center on an
analysis of the existing rules of law within their relativistic matrix.
In such an analysis, it is difficult to find the concept "no right,"
and it therefore seems inordinately imaginative and logically unnecessary to manufacture one only for the sake of symmetry.
In Mogul S.8. Co.v. McGregor, Hohfeld criticises Bowen's expression of the conflict between two equal rights - "the right of
the plaintiffs to be protected in the legitimate exercise of their
trade, and the right of the defendants to carry on their business
as seems best to them, provided they commit no wrong to others."76 Hohfeld calls the plaintiff's right a "legal right or claim
in the strict sense" and the defendant's a "privilege." He admits
that construing the passage as a whole no difficulties arise; he
further admits that the conflict or antinomy is only apparent to
the judge and alleges that there is confusion in the "rapidly shifting meanings with which the term 'right' is used." Yet Hohfeld
does not deny the validity of the decision. He fails to notice that
although there are separate rules of the calculus which, considered
in the ambiance of all the other rules of the calculus, might conflict, this causes no great inconvenience. The fact that he has to
discuss the use of "privilege" in connection with license and liberty, and, had he animadverted upon cases in constitutional
law, prerogative as well, renders the somewhat monadic, atomic
reduction to eight fundamental legal conceptions highly artificial.
Judgments are not derived from the preordained, predestined patterns or configurations fitted into a jig-saw puzzle as in a child's
game, but are derived from argument, ratiocination, calculation,
all of which build a perspicuous picture, rather like a painter
painting, than a child playing. There are, of course, different ways
of painting, and judges, very often according to the nature of the
case, and sometimes according to the intellect and learning of the
judge, use different techniques - belong, as it were, to different
schools. In the simple case the Realist school of painting best rep74. Wnwmm, op. cit. supra note 57, at 5.

75. "God proceeds legally; Publication before Judgment." DoNs,
LECTED SERMONS 112 (1919).

76. [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 611 (CA.).
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resents judgment, but Impressionism can produce as effective a
result, and where the case is difficult, Pointillism may afford the
best technique. Regardless of the choice of methods, the picture
is one of a calculus.
What I am trying to say or rather the question I am trying to
put is this. Does Hohfeldian analysis render it necessary, entitle a
critic, or force a judge to assert that any decision is wrongly decided, any decision, that is, of the House of Lords which, according to English theory, is both binding and authoritative? If so the
analysis must be false or at least faulty, for cases cannot be wrong
so long as they stand. It may be that Hohfeldian analysis enables
us to distinguish new cases from old, and this indeed is what Dias
and Hughes, in their Jurisprudence,give as its merits
As previously noted, however, there are other, more practical techniques
for drawing the distinction. The attempt to reduce logic to the
truth functions, true and false, have only ended with the attempt
by Lukasiewicz to show that there is a three-valued logic of truth,
possibility, falsity. Aristotle's "Categories" are not exhaustive,
nor does he give any reasons for choosing his categories. The preSocratic fundamental substances such as air, earth, fire and water
have long since given way to 92 or perhaps an infinite number of
elements. Likewise, the attempt to limit eight fundamental conceptions is, as it were, stillborn, as Hokfeld himself has difficulty
at the accouchment in reproducing privilege or liberty. He painfully labored to produce this point when he stated: "Thus far it
has been assumed that the term 'privilege' is the most appropriate
and satisfactory to designate the mere negation of duty. Is there
good warrant for this?" 78 He then cites authorities which do not
provide the necessary proof.-I
The rest of Hohfeld's essay is devoted to a similar discussion
of the four other correlatives and jural opposites and this discussion neither adds to, nor detracts from, the criticism of the first
four. This Article is an attempt to show that Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions are not fundamental, or are fundamental
only in the curious way in which Hohfeld makes them fundamental, that they are artificial, that they are probably infertile, that
they are possibly impractical and that they are founded upon an
American realism which itself misconceives the nature of law.
77. DiAs & HunEs, JumsPRuDENCE (1957).
78. Hoffeld, supma note 5, at 38.
79. This matter is fully discussed in Williams, supra note 50.

